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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960622-CA 
v. : 
GILBERT LORETTO, : Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Gilbert Loretto appeals his conviction for 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 (1995) and 76-2-202 (1995). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did defendant preserve his claim that the trial court 
should have quashed the jury panel based on one prospective 
juror's discussion of her personal biases? Alternatively, has 
defendant established that denying the motion deprived him of his 
right to trial by an impartial jury where the record contains no 
evidence that the prospective juror's comments influenced the 
remaining panel members? 
1 
No Utah cases establish a standard of review for motions to 
quash the panel based on a prospective juror's comments. This 
Court should review the decision for an abuse of discretion. Cf, 
State v. Morgan. 865 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Utah App. 1993) (trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for 
mistrial based on one juror's misconduct). In any event, 
defendant invited any error and failed to argue to the trial 
court the claims he argues on appeal; therefore, the court need 
not consider this case on the merits. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (defendant cannot complain on appeal about 
an error into which he led the trial court); State v. Range1. 866 
P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that reference to due 
process concerns were insufficiently specific to preserve 
Rangel's appellate claim of facial unconstitutionality). 
2. Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support 
the jury's conclusion that defendant acted as an accomplice to 
the aggravated robbery? 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court 
views the evidence and the inferences from it in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 
1212 (Utah 1993). This Court may reverse for insufficient 
evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
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inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." Id. 
3. Did the instructions unfairly emphasize the elements of 
aggravated robbery over those of accomplice liability where the 
trial court gave more instructions on accomplice liability? 
This Court should adopt a deferential standard of review for 
reviewing the trial court's selection of legally sufficient 
instructions. QJL. State v. Gallegos. 849 P.2d 586, 590 (Utah 
App. 1993) (the trial court has discretion to select between two 
legally sufficient, but different jury instructions). In 
reviewing the instructions, this Court reviews the instructions 
as a whole to determine if they fairly instruct the jury on the 
applicable law. State v. Robertson. No. 940374 at 19 (Utah 
February 18, 1997). 
4. Has defendant preserved his challenge to the trial 
court's reasonable doubt instruction? Alternatively, did the 
trial court correctly instruct the jury on reasonable doubt by 
giving an instruction that both this Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have approved? 
The trial court has discretion to select between two 
accurate but different jury instructions. State v. Gallegos. 849 
3 
P.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993). In reviewing the instructions, 
this Court reviews the instructions as a whole to determine if 
they fairly instruct the jury on the applicable law. State v. 
Robertson. No, 940374 at 19 (Utah February 18, 1997). 
In this case, defendant both invited any error in giving the 
trial court's reasonable doubt instruction and did not object to 
the instruction with sufficient particularity to preserve his 
appellate argument; therefore, the Court need not consider the 
claim on its merits. See State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 
(Utah App. 1995) (invited error where defendant told the court 
that its instruction was legally sufficient), cert, denied. 913 
P.2d 794 (Utah 1996); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 360-61 (Utah 
App. 1993) (requiring specificity in trial court objections to 
preserve appellant's argument). 
5, Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion 
for a continuance to locate a potential witness where defendant 
had no idea whether the witness had information relevant to the 
case or could attend the trial? 
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for a 
continuance for a clear abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. 
CafrutUtan, 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-2-202 
(1995) and 76-6-302 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By amended information, the State charged defendant with 
being a party to an aggravated robbery (R. 96) . The jury 
convicted defendant as charged (R. 169, 3 90). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to the statutory five-years-to-life prison 
term, and imposed a $1,000 fine with an eighty-five percent 
surcharge (R. 173). 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 174). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant assisted an unidentified man who robbed the victim 
at knife point. 
Carrie Flores went to a Smith's Food King one January 
evening (R. 304) . While waiting to pay for her groceries, she 
noticed three men, including defendant, in the checkout line 
behind her (id.). Ms. Flores paid with a fifty-dollar bill and 
held the change in her hand as she left the store (R. 305). 
After putting the groceries in the passenger side of her 
car, Ms. Flores walked to the driver's door (R. 306). As she 
opened the door, she looked up to discover defendant and the 
5 
other two men from the store standing directly in front of her 
(id.). One of them stood about one foot from her, held a knife 
to her chest, and demanded the change from the fifty dollars(R. 
306-309, 315). Defendant stood to the right and slightly behind 
the man with the knife; the third man stood in the same position 
on the other side (R. 307-308, 315). Ms. Flores gave the cash to 
the man with the knife and left the parking lot (R. 310-11, 318-
19). Police arrested defendant at the store approximately two 
days later (R. 343). 
The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
l. Denial of motion to quash jury panel- Defendant 
contends that comments made by one prospective juror tainted the 
entire panel; therefore, the trial court deprived him of his 
right to trial by an impartial jury when it denied his motion to 
quash the panel. Defendant invited any error and failed to 
preserve his appellate arguments. Defendant suggested first 
asking the panel generally whether the comments affected them and 
did not argue that the trial court had to quash the panel 
regardless of the response. The trial court adopted defendant's 
suggestion, and no jurors stated that the comments influenced 
them. Defendant did not renew his motion. 
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Defendant also contends that the single question was 
insufficient to remove the taint. However, the trial court 
limited its subsequent inquiry at defendant's request. 
Similarly, defendant did not sufficiently preserve his 
appellate arguments. In the trial court, he contended only that 
the comments may have generated a general negative response to 
him. On appeal, he contends that the comments suggested he 
belonged to a gang. His trial objection lacked sufficient 
specificity to preserve his appellate claim. 
Alternatively, this claim fails on its merits. The record 
establishes that the comments did not affect the other panel 
members. 
2. Sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant contends that 
the evidence shows, at most, that he was merely present during 
the robbery because he did not say anything intelligible, hold 
the knife to the victim, demand the money from her, or receive 
it. However, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant 
participated as an accomplice. Defendant did not stand back or 
move away from the other two men, and he stood close enough to 
see the robbery. The three men confronted Ms. Flores in 
formation: the lead man holding the knife to her chest, his 
accomplices, including defendant, close behind on either side. 
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All three stood close enough to Ms. Flores to grab her if she had 
tried to escape. The number of men and their proximity to Ms. 
Flores made it less likely that Ms. Flores would try to escape or 
that she could escape; their number made the confrontation in a 
dark parking lot more intimidating; and the positions taken by 
the group suggests a planned confrontation, or at least a 
concerted effort by all three men. 
3. Jury instruction; accomplice liability. Defendant 
contends that the trial court unfairly emphasized the elements of 
aggravated robbery over those of accomplice liability by 
including an instruction defining aggravated robbery in addition 
to the elements instruction which included the elements of both 
aggravated robbery and accomplice liability. The record rebuts 
the underlying premise of defendant's argument: that the trial 
court gave more instructions on aggravated robbery than on 
accomplice liability. Including the elements instruction, the 
trial court gave two instructions on aggravated robbery, but gave 
four on accomplice liability. 
In any event, defendant cannot establish prejudice on this 
record. Both counsel's closing arguments clearly identified 
accomplice liability as the critical determination. 
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4. Jury instructions: reasonable doubt instruction. 
Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously defined 
reasonable doubt for the jury. Defendant invited any error in 
the instructions when he told the trial court that its proposed 
instruction sufficiently defined reasonable doubt under Utah law. 
Similarly, defendant failed to object with sufficient specificity 
to preserve his appellate claim. He identified for the trial 
court none of the specific deficiencies he argues on appeal, 
stating to the trial court only that he believed his instruction 
defined reasonable doubt more clearly. 
Alternatively, the claim fails on its merits. First, the 
trial court defined reasonable doubt in language approved by both 
this Court and the Utah Supreme court. Second, the claim depends 
on dissecting the instruction and scrutinizing its individual 
sentences and phrases. This Court has expressly rejected this 
analysis and it contradicts the normal requirement of reviewing 
the instructions as a whole. Defendant's arguments fail under 
the appropriate analysis. 
5. Motion for continuance. The trial court properly 
denied defendant's motion for a continuance to contact a 
potential witness. Defendant had no idea if the witness had any 
information relevant to the case or could attend the trial and 
9 
testify on his behalf. Therefore, he failed in his burden to 
establish the potential witness's materiality and availability. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE QUASHED THE PANEL; ALTERNATIVELY, HIS 
ARGUMENT FAILS ON ITS MERITS BECAUSE THE RECORD 
CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PANEL WAS BIASED 
Defendant contends that the trial court's denial of his 
motion to quash the jury panel based on the remarks of a 
prospective juror deprived him of his right to trial by an 
impartial jury. Appellant's Brief at 12. According to 
defendant, the remarks suggested to the jurors that defendant 
belonged to a Mexican gang. Appellant's Brief at 9-10. 
During voir dire, prospective juror Bingham stated that she 
could not sit through the trial. She told the court that one of 
the witnesses had the same build as her son who had just 
committed suicide (R. 212). When the court asked her if she 
could concentrate on the trial, Ms. Bingham responded: 
I'm a very emotional person. We live next door to 
a Mexican. Still upset at them in gangs and he -- he 
dressed just like he did. I can't understand. Why 
can't he shave that thing off the back of his head? 
I'm sorry. I don't know if I could be fair 
(id.). The trial court excused Ms. Bingham immediately after her 
10 
statement (R. 213). 
In a subsequent in-chambers conference, defense counsel 
moved to quash the entire panel, alleging that Ms. Bingham's 
references to defendant's hair style may have tainted all the 
prospective jurors (R. 272-73). According to counsel: 
We, I'm afraid that the other jurors would say, 
gee, I hadn't noticed that hairstyle. Now she's 
speaking of it and I noticed that, too. And geez, that 
is kind of a problem. That's an unusual hairstyle and 
wonder what that means, or maybe they know someone of a 
similar style. They've got a problem with that. And 
simply point that out to them. And certainly, she made 
it quite clear that for her, that's a negative thing. 
And it seems like others are then going to be 
particularly noticing that and maybe they will say, 
gee, maybe I think that's negative, too. I mean, 
that's the whole reason why we don't want people 
expressing negative opinions about defendants or 
witnesses or whatever, because the rest, well, it might 
get them thinking as well 
(R. 274). Counsel never specifically complained that Ms. 
Bingham's comments might have suggested to the other prospective 
jurors that defendant belonged to a gang. 
The State conceded that Ms. Bingham made inappropriate 
comments, but pointed out that nothing showed that the comments 
had affected any of the jurors (R. 273). In response, defense 
counsel suggested asking the jurors generally whether the 
comments affected them, then asking for the details in chambers 
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if any jurors responded affirmatively to the general question (R. 
273-74). The State agreed to this procedure (R. 275). The court 
decided to ask the question, then denied defendant's motion uat 
this point" (R. 275) . 
When court resumed, the trial court asked: 
Do you recall Mrs. Helen Bingham, Juror No. 3, who 
had had a recent suicide in her family, who was quite 
emotional as she responded to some of my questions. 
And Mrs. Bingham made some comments about some 
personal prejudices in connection with this case. And 
perhaps that could be interpreted by some that way, not 
entirely clear, but she mentioned various things that 
concerned her about this case and in connection with 
the defendant in this case. 
Anyone here who feels that they were influenced by 
those comments of Mrs. Bingham in any way that would 
make it difficult for them to be fair and impartial, 
based upon her comments? Anyone? No response. 
(R. 281). Defendant did not renew his motion to quash the panel. 
Defendant now complains that Ms. Bingham's comments 
introduced evidence outside the record: a suggestion that 
defendant belonged to a gang. Appellant's Brief at 9-10. 
Defendant also contends that the subsequent voir dire, the scope 
of which he defined, did not sufficiently rebut an inference that 
the comments tainted the panel. Appellant's Brief at 10-ll.1 
defendant also states that the panel may have reacted to 
Ms. Bingham's remarks and felt some personal bias toward him. 
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A, Defendant waived his appellate claims. 
Defendant failed to preserve his appellate claims because: 
1) he invited any error by suggesting that the trial court first 
ask the jurors if the comments affected them; 2) he invited any 
error in the scope of the curative voir dire because he defined 
the scope; 3) after the remaining panel members denied that Ms. 
Bingham's comments had influenced them, defendant did not renew 
his motion to quash the panel; and 4) he did not make the 
specific objection to the trial court that he argues in support 
of reversing his conviction. 
This Court will not review an error that defendant led the 
trial court into committing. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1220-21 (Utah 1993); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205-
1206 (Utah App. 1991). In Perdue. the trial court selected two 
instructions that Perdue's counsel submitted. Id. at 1203-1204. 
On appeal, however, Perdue challenged the validity of those 
Appellant's Brief at 9. However, the subsequent discussion 
focuses solely on his contention that the comments brought in 
outside evidence suggesting that defendant belonged to a gang. 
Appellant's Brief at 9-15. Because defendant has briefed only 
that contention, that is the only one presented for this Court's 
determination. See, e.g.. State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the defendant's 
state constitutional challenge because defendant failed to 
provide any supporting legal analysis or authority). 
13 
instructions. Id. at 1204-1206. This Court refused to consider 
the instructions7 legal sufficiency because Perdue had submitted 
them and consequently invited any error. Id. at 1205-1206. 
Similarly, defendant suggested the course of action that the 
trial court ultimately took to address Ms. Bingham's comments. 
After defendant moved to strike the panel based on Ms. Bingham's 
comments, the State conceded that Ms. Bingham acted 
inappropriately, but contended that nothing established that her 
comments affected the other jurors (R. 272-73). In response, 
defendant asked the Court only to question the panel about 
whether the comments influenced them (R. 274). In response to 
the court's subsequent comment that it could not see any 
prejudice, counsel explained that the comments may have started 
the other jurors thinking that they also had a negative reaction 
to defendant's hair style (R. 274). However, counsel never 
suggested that the court would have to strike the entire panel 
even if none of the prospective jurors stated that Ms. Bingham's 
comments had biased them; indeed, if that had been counsel's 
contention, there would have been no need for the subsequent voir 
dire. (Transcript pages 272-81 are attached as addendum B.) 
The sum of defendant's comments told the trial court that, 
if Ms. Bingham's comments had not sparked any negative feelings 
14 
in the remaining prospective jurors, the court would not have to 
quash the panel. When the trial court asked the question 
defendant requested and received no response, the trial court 
legitimately concluded that it had resolved the issue. 
Defendant's failure to renew his motion to quash further 
solidified the trial court's conclusion. If defendant believed 
that the trial court should still have quashed the panel after 
the voir dire that defendant suggested, he should have renewed 
his motion or at least informed the trial court that he believed 
the issue was unresolved. His failure to do so led the trial 
court not to take any further action. 
This Court reached a similar conclusion in State v. Morgan. 
835 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1993). Morgan moved for a mistrial 
after a juror made an inappropriate comment to an alternate 
juror. Id. at 1381. The trial court individually interviewed 
each of the remaining jurors about any comments they may have 
heard. Id. Only one juror had, and she stated that she 
considered the comment in poor taste. Id. After this inquiry, 
defendant did not renew the motion. Id. This Court held that 
w[f]rom all that appears, defendant was satisfied with the 
additional scrutiny and at least tacitly withdrew the motion for 
a mistrial." Id. 
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Like Morgan, defendant failed to renew his motion. As in 
Morgan, it appears the voir dire satisfied defendant, and that he 
tacitly withdrew his motion to quash. Therefore, defendant 
cannot now complain about the denial of his motion. 
Defendant also cannot complain that the voir dire 
insufficiently cured any taint: defendant defined the scope of 
the voir dire. Defendant wanted limited voir dire in order to 
avoid any further negative comments in front of the entire panel, 
asking the trial court to reserve more detailed questions for in-
chambers discussions with those who responded affirmatively to 
the more general question (R. 273-74). When no one did, no 
reason remained for the trial court to ask the more detailed 
questions. Defendant cannot set the scope of the curative voir 
dire, then complain about its sufficiency on appeal. Cf. Id. 
Finally, defendant failed to preserve the specific argument 
he makes on appeal. In order to preserve an appellate claim, 
defendant must have objected with sufficient specificity to give 
the trial court the first opportunity to rule on the claim. 
State v. Rangel. 866 P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (generally 
referring to due process concerns held insufficient to preserve a 
challenge to a statute's facial constitutionality). On appeal, 
defendant contends that Ms. Bingham's comments suggested to the 
16 
prospective jurors that defendant may belong to a gang. 
Appellant's Brief at 9-10. However, defendant complained to the 
trial court only that the references to his hair may have sparked 
some general prejudice in the other jurors. He made no claim 
that the comments suggested gang affiliation; therefore, he never 
alerted the trial court to his present concern. 
A more specific objection also may have allowed the trial 
court to address some of the arguments defendant makes on appeal. 
For example, defendant claims that the jurors could not fairly 
assess whether Ms. Bingham's statement would affect their 
deliberations because they did not know what evidence the parties 
would introduce. Specifically, defendant contends that the 
jurors did not know that the State's evidence would implicate 
defendant as one of three Hispanic males who participated in 
robbing Ms. Flores, and that a suggestion that defendant may 
belong to a Mexican gang would affect that decision. Had 
defendant made the argument to the trial court that he makes to 
this Court, the trial court could have included a synopsis of the 
proposed evidence in his curative voir dire. 
B. Alternatively, defendant's claim fails on its merits. 
The record contains no evidence that denying the motion 
deprived defendant of his right to trial by an impartial jury. 
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To the contrary, the other prospective jurors denied that Ms. 
Bingham's comment had any influence on them, and the trial court 
complied with defendant's request to probe no further. 
The State could find no cases defining the standard of 
appellate review for a trial court's refusal to quash the panel 
based on a prospective juror's comments. However, when the 
question of juror misconduct arises in other contexts, the 
appellate courts have traditionally applied an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Morgan. 865 P.2d at 1380-81 (trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial 
based on juror misconduct); State v. Tenney. 913 P.2d 750, 757 
(Utah App.) (reviewing denial of motion for new trial based on 
juror misconduct for abuse of discretion), cert, denied. 923 P.2d 
693 (Utah 1996). Similarly, this Court reviews a trial court's 
decision to deny a challenge for cause for an abuse of 
discretion. State V. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1240 (Utah), 
cert, denied. 510 U.S. 979 (1993); State V. BrQOkS, 868 P.2d 818, 
821 n.3 (Utah App. 1994), affirmed. 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 1995). 
The Court should adopt the same standard here. Like the 
challenge for cause, the issue raised in this claim concerns the 
jury selection process. Also, like the motions for new trial and 
mistrial, the underlying issue in this case deals with a 
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prospective juror's conduct. In addition, the trial court is 
uniquely position to assess the affect of the misconduct on the 
remaining panel members. The trial court can better assess the 
credibility of the remaining members' responses to follow-up voir 
dire as well as to assess the members' reaction to the comment in 
the first place. See State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 282 (Utah 
1994) (identifying as a factor in determining the amount of 
deference to give the trial court's decision the degree to which 
the application of the legal principle depends on facts the trial 
judge is uniquely positioned to evaluate).* 
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying the motion because the record establishes that Ms. 
Bingham's comments had no influence on the other panel members. 
When asked, the other prospective jurors denied that her comments 
influenced them (R. 281). The limitations defendant placed on 
the voir dire precluded any additional inquiry. 
Moreover, Ms. Bingham's comments did not clearly suggest 
that defendant belonged to a gang, and nothing in the record 
suggests that the other prospective jurors understood them to do 
so. In her rambling soliloquy, Ms. Bingham stated that she 
2Defendant concurs that abuse of discretion correctly states 
the standard of review. Appellant's Brief at 1. 
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thought defendant should cut his hair,3 commented that defendant 
dressed like her neighbors, suggested that her neighbors belonged 
to a gang, and identified her neighbors as "Mexicans" (R. 212).4 
However, she drew no conclusion that her neighbors' dress was 
related to their gang membership. At most, her comments 
establish that she could not be fair because defendant reminded 
her of the Mexican neighbors she did not like. Nothing suggests 
that the other jurors understood the comments to signify anything 
more. In any event, the limitations defendant placed on the voir 
dire precluded a more in depth inquiry into the effect Ms. 
Bingham's comments had. 
Defendant contends that this Court should presume prejudice 
from Ms. Bingham's comments. Appellant's Brief at 12-14. Under 
this analysis, defendant contends that Ms. Bingham's comments 
create a rebuttable presumption that the jury was tainted. 
3Defendant erroneously contends that Ms. Bingham stated that 
he wore his hair like her neighbors. However, Ms. Bingham stated 
only that defendant dressed like her neighbors, her comment about 
his hair suggested only that she did not like his hair style (R. 
212) . 
4As already quoted, Ms. Bingham stated, "I'm a very 
emotional person. We live next door to a Mexican. Still upset 
at them in gangs and he -- he dressed just like he did. I can't 
understand. Why can't he shave that thing off the back of his 
head? I'm sorry. I don't know if I could be fair" (R. 212). 
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The cases on which defendant relies require the opposite 
conclusion. Those cases apply the rebuttable presumption only to 
contacts between jurors and either witnesses, attorneys, or other 
court personnel. £££, e.g., State v. Pikg. 712 P.2d 277, 279 
(Utah 1985). Unlike Pike, this case involves juror conduct 
unrelated to improper contacts with any counsel, witnesses, or 
court personnel; therefore, defendant must establish prejudice. 
S££., £-.a. . State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254, 1263 (Utah 1983) 
(applying a traditional prejudice analysis where two jurors read 
newspaper accounts of the trial). 
Moreover, the evil protected against by the rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice does not exist in cases like this. The 
rebuttable presumption exists, in part, because contact between 
the jurors and counsel, witnesses, or court personnel creates the 
appearance of collusion between the jurors and one of the parties 
or the court. State Yt Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah App. 
1992) . No appearance of collusion exists where, as here, jurors 
make inappropriate comments. Therefore, the Court should apply 
no rebuttable presumption of prejudice. 
Defendant argues alternatively that he has established 
prejudice because Ms. Bingham's comments suggested that he 
belonged to a Mexican gang and the evidence showed that he was in 
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a group of Hispanics who robbed Ms. Flores. Appellant's Brief at 
14-15. For support, defendant depends on his assertion that Ms. 
Bingham said that he looked like a Mexican gang member. For the 
reasons argued above, the record does not support this assertion; 
therefore, defendant has not established prejudice from Ms. 
Bingham's responses. 
In short, defendant has not preserved this claim because he 
invited any error in both the trial court's decision to deny the 
motion to quash and in the scope of the court's curative voir 
dire. Defendant also failed to object to Ms. Bingham's comments 
with sufficient particularity to preserve his appellate argument. 
Alternatively, defendant has not established that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion to quash the panel, 
or that denying the motion deprived him of a trial by an 
impartial jury: there is no record evidence that Ms. Bingham's 
comments influenced the other prospective jurors. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS ONE OF THREE MEN WHO CONFRONTED 
THE VICTIM, THE RECORD CONTAINS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
THAT HE PARTICIPATED IN THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Defendant contends that the evidence shows, at most, that he 
was merely present at the robbery, but fails to show that he 
participated as an accomplice. Appellant's Brief at 16-19. 
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Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence sufficiently 
established that defendant encouraged or intentionally aided in 
committing the robbery. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court 
views the evidence and the inferences from it in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1212 (Utah 1993) . This Court may reverse for insufficient 
evidence "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." Id. 
In order to convict defendant, the jury had to conclude that 
he had the mental state required to commit a criminal offense and 
that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided the man with the knife while that man robbed 
Ms. Flores. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995). See also State v. 
Alvarez. 872 P.2d 450, 461-62 (Utah 1994) (defining the elements 
of accomplice liability for purposes of the gang enhancement 
statute).5 
Defendant and two others appeared in front of Ms. Flores 
defendant does not dispute that the evidence sufficiently 
established that an aggravated robbery took place. 
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while she started to enter her car (R. 306). Defendant and the 
other man flanked the man with the knife; all three stood 
approximately one foot from Ms. Flores (R. 306-309). The man 
with the knife held it to Ms. Flores' chest and demanded the 
money (R. 309). 
Admittedly, defendant said nothing intelligible to Ms. 
Flores,6 did not threaten her with a weapon, and did not take the 
money from her himself. Nevertheless, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that defendant encouraged or intentionally aided the man 
with the knife. Defendant did not stand back or move away from 
the other two men, and he stood close enough to see the robbery. 
The three men confronted Ms. Flores in formation: the lead man 
holding the knife to her chest, his accomplices, including 
defendant, close behind on either side. All three stood close 
enough to Ms. Flores to grab her if she had tried to escape. The 
number of men and their proximity to Ms. Flores made it less 
likely that Ms. Flores would try to escape or that she could 
escape; their number made the confrontation in a dark parking lot 
more intimidating; and the positions taken by the group suggests 
a planned confrontation, or at least a concerted effort by all 
6Ms. Flores testified that defendant appeared to giggle or 
mumble something unintelligible (R. 309). 
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three men. Therefore, the record contains some evidence that 
defendant encouraged or intentionally aided in committing the 
robbery with the mental state to commit an offense. See, e.g.. 
State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993) (*[w]e will affirm the 
jury verdict as long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made'") (citation 
omitted). 
Essentially, defendant contends that he did not act as an 
accomplice because he did not take the money from Ms. Flores, did 
not say anything to her, and did not hold the knife. Contrary to 
defendant's contention, these facts do not necessitate concluding 
that he intentionally aided in the robbery. See Sanders v. 
State. 423 So.2d 348, 351 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) ("[a]lthough 
appellant did not say a word, carry the gun or touch the money, 
his demeanor and actions during the course of the robbery 
demonstrated clearly that he intended to aid and abet Houston in 
committing the crime"). As already argued, the facts establish 
that defendant acted as an accomplice to the aggravated robbery. 
The cases on which defendant relies do not require a 
contrary result. For example, in State v. Wood. Lance Wood and 
Michael Archuleta murdered Gordon Church. Prior to killing Mr. 
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Church, Archuleta sexually assaulted him three times. First, 
Archuleta forced Mr. Church over the hood of the car and raped 
him anally while Wood stood by the trunk of the car. State v. 
Wood. 868 P.2d at 75. Archuleta asked Wood if he "wanted any;" 
Wood declined. Id. Second, Archuleta attached battery jumper 
cable clamps to Mr. Church's genitals. Id. "Wood maintained 
before and at trial that he removed the clamps from Church as 
soon as he realized what Archuleta had done." Id. Finally, 
Archuleta shoved and kicked a tire iron so far up Mr. Church's 
rectum that it pierced his liver. Id. While Archuleta impaled 
Mr. Church with the tire iron, Wood kicked Mr. Church. Id. at 
88. On this evidence, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the 
evidence failed to establish that Wood acted as an accomplice to 
the first two acts of sexual assault, but that he did act as an 
accomplice to the third. Id. 
Unlike Wood, defendant did not decline a specific invitation 
to participate and took no action to negate the actions of the 
man with the knife. Also unlike Wood, defendant was not 
physically removed the crime. To the contrary, defendant stood 
close enough to Ms. Flores that he could have grabbed her if she 
tried to escape. 
This is not a case where defendant had the misfortune to be 
26 
present while the man with the knife committed the robbery; 
defendant stood at the robber's side, lending support through his 
presence. Compare also State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 
1977) (other officers not accomplices to defendant officer's 
evidence tampering where jury found that the officers merely 
followed their superior's orders and did not know what he 
planned); State v. Gee. 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972) (two 
witnesses were not accomplices, and could therefore testify, 
where there was no evidence that they assisted in or were present 
during the crime). Therefore, the evidence is not so inherently 
improbable that reasonable persons must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt about defendant's participation. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AND FAIRLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF BOTH ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY AND 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
Defendant contends that the trial court excessively 
emphasized the elements of aggravated robbery over accomplice 
liability by including an instruction about aggravated robbery in 
addition to the elements instruction. Appellant's Brief at 19-
20.7 However, defendant does not contend that these instructions 
7Defendant did not contest that someone robbed Ms. Flores at 
knife-point. He argued only that he did not participate and that 
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misstate the law or that the trial court refused to give a 
necessary instruction. 
A. Standard of appellate review-
No case specifically defines the scope of appellate review 
when an appellant claims that individually accurate instructions 
unfairly emphasize some aspect of the case. Cases considering a 
trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction review the 
matter as a question of law, giving no deference to the trial 
court's decision. £££, gtgt, State v, RQbertSPn, No. 940374 at 
18 (Utah February 18, 1997). However, the trial court has 
discretion to select between two legally sufficient instructions. 
State v. Galleaos. 849 P.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant does not claim that the instructions given 
misstate the law; only that they inordinately focus on one aspect 
of the case. Defendant's challenge does not present a question 
of the instructions' legal sufficiency. Rather, defendant 
challenges the trial court's selection among legal sufficient 
instructions. Therefore, the Court should apply an abuse of 
discretion standard. Cf. State v. Galleaos. 849 P.2d 586, 590 
(Utah App. 1993) (the trial court has discretion to select 
she could not identify him adequately (R. 369). (He has not 
raised the second issue on appeal.) 
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between two legally sufficient, but different jury instructions). 
B. The record does not support defendant's argument. 
Even under a nondeferential standard of review, however, 
defendant's argument fails on its merits because it relies on a 
premise that the record rebuts: that the court gave only one 
accomplice liability instruction and two aggravated robbery 
instructions. The trial court's elements instruction contained 
the elements of both aggravated robbery and accomplice liability 
(R. 151). Immediately before that instruction, the trial court 
gave the statutory definition of aggravated robbery (R. 150). 
Immediately after the elements instruction, the trial court gave 
the statutory definition of accomplice liability (R. 152). In 
two subsequent instructions, the trial court clarified that 
defendant's mere presence would not suffice to convict him as an 
accomplice, and that the jury could consider only defendant's 
conduct and could not consider the status of the other 
participants (R. 153-54). Contrary to defendant's contention, 
the trial court gave four instructions defining and clarifying 
accomplice liability, and only two aggravated robbery 
instructions. If anything, the trial court emphasized accomplice 
liability over aggravated robbery. 
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C. Defendant has not established prejudice from the 
instructions. 
Moreover, defendant cannot establish prejudice on this 
record. See State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 930-31 (Utah App. 
1991) (w[w]e will reverse on the basis of an improper instruction 
only where the defendant demonstrates prejudice stemming from the 
instructions viewed in the aggregate"), reversed on other 
grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). Even if the instructions had 
given insufficient emphasis to the elements of accomplice 
liability, both attorneys' closing arguments clearly identified 
that the case turned on whether defendant acted as an accomplice 
(R. 3 68-77, 382, 384-86). The jury could not have become 
confused and convicted defendant based solely on a finding that 
an aggravated robbery occurred without taking the additional step 
of finding him guilty as an accomplice. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR IN THE REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION; ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
DEFINED REASONABLE DOUBT BY USING A JURY INSTRUCTION 
APPROVED BY BOTH THIS COURT AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly defined 
reasonable doubt for the jury. Appellant's Brief at 21-25. 
Defendant further contends that, in light of the purported 
deficiencies in the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction, 
30 
the trial court erroneously refused to give his reasonable 
alternative hypothesis instruction. Appellant's Brief at 25-27. 
Generally, a trial court's refusal to give a requested jury 
instruction presents a legal question reviewed for correctness. 
See, e.g.. State v. Galleaos. 849 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993). 
However, the trial court has discretion to select between two 
accurate but different jury instructions. State v. Galleaos, 849 
p.2d 586, 590 (Utah App. 1993). isL. see also State v, Petersen, 
802 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Utah App. 1990) (u[s]ince we conclude the 
court's instruction was appropriate, we need not consider whether 
defendant's proposed instruction might also have been proper or 
even preferable"), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
The trial court defined reasonable doubt in the same 
language that this Court approved in Pedersen and the Utah 
Supreme Court approved in Robertson (R. 142)(a copy of the 
instruction is attached as addendum C). State v. Pedersen, 802 
P.2d at 1331; State v. Robertson. No. 940374 (Utah February 18, 
1997). Defendant presented the trial court with his own 
reasonable doubt instruction (R. 125)(a copy is attached as 
addendum D). Defendant objected to the trial court's proposed 
instruction; however, defendant contended only that his proposed 
instruction more clearly defined reasonable doubt (R. 361). 
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Defendant did not contend that the court's instruction misstated 
the standard; to the contrary, he acknowledged that this Court 
had approved the language (id.). 
Defendant failed to preserve his appellate claim. First, 
defendant invited any error when he told the trial court that its 
instruction adequately defined reasonable doubt, but that his 
defined it better. State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 
1995) controls this issue. Blubaugh responded to the State's 
proposed "depraved indifference" instruction that it accurately 
stated the law, but that his provided a more accurate and 
adequate definition of depraved indifference. Id. at 700. This 
Court held that Blubaugh invited error, precluding review of his 
appellate claim, when he agreed that the instruction given 
correctly defined depraved indifference. Id. 
Similarly, defendant told the trial court that its proposed 
instruction was legally sufficient under existing case law and 
stated only that his gave a clearer definition of reasonable 
doubt (R. 361). Under Blubauah. defendant cannot tell the trial 
court that its proposed instruction is legally sufficient, then 
argue for the first time on appeal that it is not. 
Moreover, defendant did not provide a specific enough 
objection to the trial court's instruction to preserve his 
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appellate argument. £££, e.g., State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 
360-61 (Utah App. 1993) (to preserve an appellate argument, 
defendants must object with sufficient specificity to give the 
trial court the first opportunity to correct the errors). In 
this Court, defendant contends that the trial court's instruction 
presumed his guilt and minimized the State's burden of proof. 
Appellant's Brief at 23-25. In the trial court, however, 
defendant contended only that his instruction more clearly 
defined reasonable doubt. Because defendant did not give the 
trial court the opportunity to address the deficiencies he now 
claims burdened the court's reasonable doubt instruction, he has 
not preserved those claims for this Court's review. See State v. 
Range1. 866 P.2d 607, 612 (Utah App. 1993) (generally referring 
to due process concerns held insufficient to preserve a challenge 
to a statute's facial constitutionality). 
Alternatively, defendant's argument fails on its merits. 
This Court must apply a three-part test to determine whether the 
reasonable doubt instruction correctly states Utah law: 1) the 
instruction must specifically state that the State's proof must 
obviate all reasonable doubt; 2) the instruction should not state 
that a reasonable doubt equates to one that governs a person in 
the "more weighty affairs of life; and 3) the instruction may not 
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instruct that a reasonable doubt is not a mere possibility, but 
it may state that a fanciful or wholly speculative possibility 
does not defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Robertson. No. 940374 at 20. In Robertson, the supreme court 
found that a reasonable doubt instruction identical to the one 
given in this case passed all three criteria. Id. at 19-21. 
Therefore, under Robertson, the trial court correctly instructed 
the jury on reasonable doubt. 
Defendant contends that the instruction: 1) presumes 
defendant's guilt; and 2) lowers the State's burden of proof. 
Appellant's Brief at 23-25. To support these contentions, 
defendant reduces the instruction to individual sentences, even 
to individual phrases. Appellant's Brief at 22-23. Defendant's 
proposed analysis, however, directly contradicts the appropriate 
inquiry: whether the jury instructions taken as a whole fairly 
tender the case to the jury. £££, e,gt, State v. Perdue. 813 
P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App.. 1991) .8 Moreover, this Court has 
expressly rejected an analysis similar to defendant's. In State 
v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1991), Haston, like defendant, 
8The sole exception to this rule is that this Court must 
reverse when the elements instruction omits one of the elements 
even though another instruction may include it. State v. Jones. 
734 P.2d 473, 475-76 (Utah 1987). 
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dissected the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction. This 
Court held that wwe consider the instruction in its entirety." 
JtfL at 932, reversed on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant's arguments fail when the instructions are viewed 
as a whole. Defendant relies on a single sentence to support his 
claim that the instruction shifted the burden of proof to him: 
"And, in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal" (R. 
142)(emphasis added). According to defendant, the highlighted 
language presumes that guilt exists. Appellant's Brief at 23. 
Both the reasonable doubt instruction and numerous other verbal 
and written instructions informed the jury that the State had to 
prove defendant's guilt. At the beginning of the case, the trial 
court informed the jury that defendant pleaded not guilty, and 
that defendant's plea required the State to prove defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that the jury had to acquit 
defendant if a reasonable doubt existed; and that the State's 
evidence must eliminate all reasonable doubt (R. 286-87). Before 
deliberations, the trial court again instructed the jury that 
defendant's guilty plea required the State to prove each of the 
essential allegations beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 138). 
The reasonable doubt instruction began by reminding the jury 
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that "All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt" (R. 142). The 
instruction states a second time that the State has the burden of 
proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (id.). In 
the eyewitness identification instruction, the trial court again 
stated, "I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the 
defendant is the person who committed the crime in on the 
prosecution," and that, if a reasonable doubt existed, the jurors 
must find defendant not guilty (R. 161). 
In addition to the instructions, defense counsel repeatedly 
reminded the jury who had the burden of proof. In her opening 
statement, counsel told the jurors that, because they had yet to 
hear any evidence, they had to presume defendant innocent; and 
that the presumption of innocence is not a neutral position, but 
a presumption that defendant is not guilty (R. 295-97). Again, 
in her closing, counsel emphasized that the State, not defendant, 
had the burden of proof (R. 378). 
Therefore, even if "his guilt," when read in isolation, 
conceivably suggests that defendant committed the charged crime, 
the instructions, when read as a whole, could have left no doubt 
that the jury must acquit defendant unless State discharged its 
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duty to prove defendant's guilt.9 
Similarly, the instructions correctly stated the State's 
burden. Defendant also contends that the reasonable doubt 
instruction permits the jurors to convict if the evidence merely 
satisfies them of defendant's guilt. Appellant's Brief at 23. 
Defendant relies on the same sentence to support his argument: 
"And, in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal" (R. 
142)(emphasis added). 
Again, defendant's argument depends on reviewing the phrase 
"satisfactorily shown" out of context with the rest of the 
reasonable doubt instruction, the instructions as a whole, and 
counsel's argument. As summarized above, the instructions and 
argument repeatedly reminded the jury that, to convict defendant, 
they had to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 
138, 142, 161, 286-87, 295-97, 378). When read in context of the 
instructions as a whole, "satisfactorily shown" means that the 
State must have satisfied the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that 
defendant committed the crime. 
9Moreover, defendant's argument tortures the syntax of the 
entire sentence on which he relies: the rest of the sentence 
tells the jurors that guilt must be "shown." Therefore, it does 
not presume that guilt already exists. 
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Defendant also complains that the sentence "proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty" 
implies that the State has the benefit of a degree of doubt as to 
its proof. Appellant's Brief at 23. Defendant contends that the 
sentence misstates the law because uncertainty or doubt inures to 
his benefit.10 
Again, defendant invited any error in using this language 
because he proposed the same language (R. 125). See State v. 
Haston. 811 P.2d at 932 (Haston could not challenge language in 
the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction that he included 
in his proposed instruction). 
Alternatively, this argument fails on its merits because it 
relies on a misstatement of the law: defendant is not entitled to 
the benefit of any uncertainty or doubt, only to the benefit a 
reasonable uncertainty or doubt. £JL. State V, RobertSQtt, No. 
940374 at 20-21 (approving language that a reasonable doubt is 
one that reasonable persons would entertain). The instructions 
specifically informed the jury that they had to acquit defendant 
if a reasonable doubt existed (R. 142). 
Finally, defendant complains that the structure of the 
10Defendant acknowledges that the sentence correctly states 
the law. Appellant's Brief at 25. 
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reasonable doubt instruction "narrows the definition of 
reasonable doubt almost to the point of non-existence." 
Appellant's Brief at 24. This occurs, according to defendant, 
because much of the instruction tells the jury what reasonable 
doubt is not. Id, 
Defendant's argument proceeds from a mistaken premise. 
Defining reasonable doubt negatively does not diminish it to the 
point of non-existence. The instruction clarifies reasonable 
doubt in part by eliminating what it is not. After the 
elimination process, what is left is reasonable doubt. It does 
not diminish it to non-existence, it simply distills away points 
of possible confusion. 
For the reasons argued above, defendant has not established 
any error in the reasonable doubt instruction given. 
Defendant also contends that the trial court should have 
given his reasonable alternative hypothesis. This claim stands 
or falls on the validity of the reasonable doubt instruction 
given. When the trial court adequately defines the State's 
burden in other instructions, it may refuse a reasonable 
alternative hypothesis instruction. See State v. Robertson. No. 
940374 at 21 (reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction is 
not required where the trial court instructs the jury that they 
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must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. 
£lQU$i# 722 P.2d 750, 755-56 (Utah 1986). For the reasons argued 
above, defendant has shown no reversible error in the reasonable 
doubt instruction given. Therefore, the trial court properly 
refused his reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction. 
In sum, defendant invited any error when he confirmed the 
legal sufficiency of the trial court's reasonable doubt 
instruction and waived his appellate arguments by not presenting 
them to the trial court. Alternatively, he trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it selected a reasonable doubt 
instruction approved by the appellate courts over defendant's 
proposed instruction. 
POINT V 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT PROFFER THE TESTIMONY THAT HE 
ANTICIPATED A PROSPECTIVE WITNESS WOULD GIVE, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO CONTINUE IN ORDER 
TO LOCATE THE WITNESS 
At the pretrial conference, held six days before trial, 
defense counsel asked for a continuance to find a witness (R. 
192, 196) . Counsel told the trial court that she had left 
messages with a person who may know the prospective witness, but 
had not received word back (R. 192). Defense counsel told the 
court that she did not know what the witness would say, only that 
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she believed the witness was at the robbery and needed to talk to 
him to determine what he might say (R. 193). The trial court 
denied the motion because defendant failed to establish any 
particulars about the witness's proposed testimony (R. 193-94). 
Defendant contends that denying the motion deprived him of due 
process. Appellant's Brief at 27-30. 
This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for a 
continuance for a clear abuse of discretion only. See, e.g.. 
State v. Cabututan. 861 P.2d 408, 413 (Utah 1993). To prevail on 
appeal, defendant must also establish that the denial materially 
prejudiced him or that he could have obtained a different result 
if the trial court had granted the motion. State v. Oliver. 820 
P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1992) . 
In order to obtain a continuance to procure the witness's 
testimony, defendant had the burden to show "that the testimony 
sought is material and admissible, that the witness could 
actually be produced, that the witness could be produced within a 
reasonable time, and that due diligence has been exercised before 
the request for a continuance." State v. Linden. 761 P.2d 1386, 
1387 (Utah 1988) . In Linden, the supreme court affirmed the 
denial of a continuance because the record lacked any information 
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about the names and availability of Linden's witnesses, the 
materiality of their testimony, or any other facts that would 
have assisted the trial court in determining whether the 
witnesses had essential or only cumulative testimony. Id. 
Defendant similarly failed to meet his burden. Defense 
counsel never identified the witness; not only failed to 
establish that the witness had material testimony, but admitted 
that she did not even know what he would say; had not actually 
talked to the witness, and consequently could not establish that 
she could procure his attendance at all, let alone within a 
reasonable time (R. 192-93). Therefore, under Linden, the trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion for a continuance. 
Defendant turns his burden on its head in order to excuse 
his failure to meet it. He contends that his counsel could not 
meet this burden until she spoke to the witness. Essentially, 
defendant argues that, whenever defense counsel tells the trial 
court that she knows of a person who may have seen something 
relevant and may testify about what he saw, but does not know 
that the person saw anything, does not know what the person would 
say, and cannot establish that she can produce the person in a 
reasonable time, the trial court nevertheless abuses its 
discretion when it denies a continuance motion to obtain the 
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person's presence. Linden recognizes that the trial court need 
not wait for witnesses with unknown testimony and unknown 
availability. If defendant cannot even proffer what a possible 
witness might add to his defense, the trial court need not delay 
trial to secure the witness's attendance. 
Defendant also has not established that denying the motion 
materially prejudiced his case or that granting the motion would 
have changed the result.11 To the contrary, defendant has never 
shown what the witness could have added to his case. It is just 
as likely that the witness saw nothing, or that what the witness 
saw would have supported the State's case. 
Because defendant has shown neither an abuse of discretion 
in or prejudice from denying the motion, he has not established 
that denying it constitutes reversible error. 
11
 Defendant made the motion six days before trial (R. 
192). In effect, defendant had at least six additional days to 
locate the witness. However, defendant never again mentioned the 
witness. Consequently, he never established that he could secure 
the witness's testimony even if given more time. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the State requests that the 
Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £-*7^ day of /V\u*rM , 
m? 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-202 
PART2 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF 
ANOTHER 
76-2-201- Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) * Agent* means any director, officer, employee, or other person 
authorized to act in behalf of a corporation or association. 
(2) "High managerial agent" means: 
(a) A partner in a partnership; 
(b) An officer of a corporation or association; 
(c) An agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such 
responsibility that his conduct reasonably may be assumed to repre-
sent the policy of the corporation or association. 
(3) "Corporation" means all organizations required by the laws of this 
state or any other state to obtain a certificate of authority, a certificate of 
incorporation, or other form of registration to transact business as a 
corporation within this state or any other state and shall include domestic, 
foreign, profit and nonprofit corporations, but shall not include a corpora-
tion sole, as such term is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. Lack of an appropriate certificate of authority, incorporation, or 
other form of registration shall be no defense when such organization 
conducted its business in a manner as to appear to have lawful corporate 
existence. 
History: C. 1963, 76-2-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196,1 76-2-201. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute Am. Jur. 2d* — 73 Am. Jar. 2d Statutes 
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia- f 224. 
bility: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors, 1988 GJ.S. — 22 C J A Criminal Law | 127. 
Utah L Rev. 847. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 1,13. 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct 
History: C. 1953, 76*2-202, enacted by L. Wildlife Resources Code, ( 23-20-23. 
1973, ch. 196,1 76-2-202. Obstructing justice, i 76*306. 
Cross-Reference*. — Aiding violation of 
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76-6-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery* if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-302, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1973, ch. 196, I 76-6-302; 1975, ch. 51, f 1; ment, effective May 2,1994, added Subjection 
1989, ch. 170, i 7; 1994, ch. 271,1 1. (1X0. 
ADDENDUM B 
explaining why she was so upset. But she talked about 
having lost a son to suicide and then a couple of times 
mentioned the word "prejudice". 
And then, at some point, started talking about—it 
wasn't clear to me even what the connection was, if any, 
with her son's suicide, but something about, I'm still upset 
with the Mexicans that live next door to me or in my 
neighborhood. And she was looking at Mr. Loretto and 
gesturing towards him. Saying something like, and they 
dress like he did. And I don't know why he doesn't cut off, 
and kind of demonstrated the hair on the back of his neck. 
And now that wasn't responsive to any particular question. 
It was just a comment she was making, trying to explain her 
situation. 
But I think the clear implication is, is that she 
has some prejudice against or concern about the neighbors 
she has. That she, I think, was trying to express she may 
have the same concern about my client, Gilbert Loretto. An 
was pointing out to other jurors his hairstyle and I guess 
his manner of dress. I'm not exactly sure, but she was 
referring to my client. 
THE COURT: He was dressed great. 
MS. REMAL: Dressed okay, but he did have a 
particular hairstyle that she was obviously trying to, when 
she demonstrated kind of to the back of her neck, that she 
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is referring to long hair at the back of the neck. 
2 I 
My concern is that she has tainted the whole panel 
by doing that. And so I would move, first of all, to strike 
the whole panel for cause, for that reason. 
I also have some specific— 
THE COURT: Before you get to these, Mr. Blaylock, 
do you want to respond to that? 
8
 MR. BLAYLOCK: Well, your Honor, if we had known 
9
 I before, we could have asked the jurors that came in here how 
those comments affected them. Z think most of them would 
have indicated that that bothered them and that they thought 
that she w a s — I don't think it would have influenced them in 
any way. It would have bothered them, but I think the 
attitude she had and the way she was acting was 
inappropriate; but we don't know what the jury thinks 
because we didn't ask that question. If we had known 
17
 I before, we could have inquired of the individuals that we 
18
 examined in chambers. 
"•9 THE COURT: Ha. Remal, any final comment? 
20 J MS. REMAL: I guess in response to that, we could 
certainly ask the question. We could go back out and the 
2 2
 I Court could ask something like, You heard the comments that 
2 3
 were made by Ms. Bingham, I guess that's her name, and is 
2 4
 there anybody that has been influenced in any way? I don't 
2 5
 I know if you want to use "influenced", or that has been 
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biased about that. 
And then to avoid the other similar type of 
problem, to bring them into chambers to find out what that 
means. We don't want them to say it in front of anybody 
else again. 
THE COURT: Hell, I'm not sure that I have a 
problem in asking the question. I don't think that, 
8
 however, that she said anything that would prejudice 
9
 J anything that this defendant—well, she was describing a 
personal prejudice she has about a hairstyle and whatever. 
How would that taint the other jurors? 
MS. REMAL: Well, I'm afraid that the other jurors 
would say, gee, I hadn't noticed that hairstyle. Now she's 
speaking of it and I noticed that, too. And geez, that is 
15
 I kind of a problem. That's an unusual hairstyle and wonder 
16
 ' what that means, or maybe they know someone of a similar 
17
 | style. They've got a problem with that. And simply point 
18
 ' that out to them. And certainly, she made it quite clear 
19
 that for her, that's a negative thing. 
20
 I And it seems like others are then going to be 
particularly noticing that and maybe they will say, gee, 
22
 I maybe I think that's negative, too. I mean, that's the 
23
 I whole reason why we don't want people expressing negative 
opinions about defendants or witnesses or whatever, because 
25
 | the rest, well, it might get them thinking as well. 
7» 
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THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock, do you have any 
objection if the question is asked? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I have no objection. I think the 
Court can kind of—well, it1* already covered when the Court 
asked if there was any particular reason they would not like 
to have themselves sitting on the jury. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll ask, and I think that 
probably that did cover it; but I'm going to go ahead and 
ask the question and ask if Mrs. Bingham1s comments in any 
way, if they feel in any way that would affect their ability! 
to be fair after considering her comments. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, in regard to the other--
THE COURT: But at this point, I'm going to deny 
the motion to strike the entire panel. 
Are there any others that you have? 
MS. REMAL: There are, your Honor. 
I would move to strike No. 4, Bart Rowland, 
because he indicated that because someone is a police 
officer, he believes that they would not lie. 
THE COURT: Before you get into that, let's take 
them one at a time. 
Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: A number of similar situations and 
I don't know that they could be avoided merely because of a 
person's position, he would be more credible. 
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THE COURT: You do not object? 
MR. BLAYLOCR: That's No. 4? 
THE COURT: That takes care of No. 4. 
There were also others? 
MS. REMAL: Ms. Castillo, No. 5, indicated the 
same, so I would move to strike her. 
THE COURT: Just a moment. Let me get these. 
Mr. Eliason is No. 9? 
MS. REMAL: Right. He indicated the same. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Mr. Carter. 
MS. REMAL: No. 11. 
THE COURT: You know, I've never had anyone answer 
in that way to that question. 
MS. REMAL: I've had people answer affirmatively 
to it before, but not this many on one panel. 
THE COURT: And here, on this one panel, we have 
five. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Pearl World was the last one. 
THE COURT: Who is after Carter? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: Pearl World, No. 25. Her husband 
was with the Sheriff's Department. 
THE COURT: Okay. Pearl World, she's No. 25. 
MS. REMAL: I thought there were five. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: There were five. No. 11 and 25. 
MS. REMAL: Okay. 
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THE COURT: Mo. 4, Ho. 5, Mo. 11, No. 9 and 25; 
correct? All right. 
Any others? 
MS. REMAL: Yes. The next one was Ms. Jones. I 
understand that she tried very hard and indicated to us as 
best as she could. I think that she felt as though she 
could be fair as a juror and indicated that there were—she 
has experienced both sides of the situation, and 
nonetheless, Z would move to strike her. I think it is just 
too close for comfort that she herself was a victim of a 
robbery and in a situation somewhat similar to what the 
State is alleging already. 
She is a woman who lives alone, at night was 
approached by somebody on foot. Money was taken from her 
and granted, it was 13 years ago; but nonetheless, I think 
that those factors certainly are going to make her identify 
with the alleged victim, who also is a woman who was alone, 
in a parking lot, after dark, and money was taken from her. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: She indicated she could be fair and| 
impartial. I think she probably could. 
THE COURT: I'll deny four challenge with regard 
to Lisa Jones. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: There's a balancing interest on thej 
other side because of her feelings toward the— 
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THE COURT: My impression of course is, these 
matters are largely within the discretion of the Judge. I 
have to go based on my feeling that she would be fair and 
impartial as a juror. 
Do you have any others? 
MS. REMAL: Yes. I would move to strike, I don't 
know if it's Jose or Jose'Velasco. No. 22, in the back row. 
THE COURT: Velasco? 
MS. REMAL: He indicated that he was a witness of 
a robbery, and in fact, sounds like he was a victim of a 
robbery as well. He indicated that that was about seven 
years ago when he lived in L.A. He was the manager of a 
store in which there was a robbery at gunpoint and money wasj 
taken. 
When the Court asked him whether or not he 
believed he could be fair or whether or not he thought that 
would affect him, his first response was, "I hope not", and 
then after a follow-up question, he indicated that he 
thought he could be fair again. Being the victim of that 
kind of a situation, when a weapon was used, here the 
allegation is that a weapon was used. In that situation, 
money was taken, in this situation the allegations are that 
money was taken. 
And I feel as though he wouldn't be able to be 
fair and that would affect your judgment. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: He indicated that be could be fair 
and impartial. I believe he could. There's a lot of 
competing interest there, also. 
THE COURT: My feeling is that he could be fair. 
I don't get the impression that he's prejudiced in any way; 
in fact, I thought he was quite favorable and I was 
impressed with Mr. Velasco. 
Any others? 
MS. REMAL: That's it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Blaylock? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: He have 17 left. 
Ho. I don't have any challenges for cause. The 
question we have before us is what we do with Mr. Killpack. 
THE COURT: How, we have the hardship folks. With| 
regard to the hardships, let's discuss those. 
There was Mr. Cornelison who works at Federal 
Express. I think he probably has some financial problems, 
but any juror is faced with that. I think that's not a good| 
excuse. 
Mr. Killpack, on the other hand, I was a little 
concerned about that because he's self-employed. I have a 
lot of sympathy for these people who are self-employed, 
contractors; trying to schedule people who come in and build 
houses. There is pressure to get a house built in a certainj 
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period of time. You've got to get concrete poured this 
-afternoon and they're going to have to cancel. Ifm inclined) 
to excuse him, but either of you object? 
4
 | MR. BLAYLOCK: Re still have 16. 
1
 MS. REMAL: Your Honor, I would object. I feel 
6 like I understand it's hard for him and I guess I don't 
really see that his financial hardship is really any worse 
8
 than Mr. Cornelison's or anybody else's. It's very 
9
 I inconvenient for him and I know it is a hassle; but it 
sounded like from what he said that he could make 
arrangements if he needed to, as long as he knew within the 
next little while if he was going to be selected or not. So) 
then he could call somebody to get a message to the people 
14
 J who are waiting for him. 
15
 I MR. BLAYLOCK: Call the cement company and tell 
1® • them not to come. 
17
 | THE COURT: Yeah. He can. Well, all right. You 
object and so let's wait and see, and if we get to kind of aj 
19
 J borderline discretion issue, I'll ask this final question 
20 |
 an(j s e e k o w w e get out. Okay? All right. 
21 (Whereupon, the Court resumed session in open 
22 court.) 
23 THE COURT: Let's go back on the record. Let the 
2 4
 record show the presence of the jury, the counsel and the 
2 5
 I defendant. 
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Members of the jury, I thank you for your 
patience. It took a little longer than we had anticipated. 
I have one final question I would like to ask each] 
of you. Do you recall Mrs. Helen Bingham, Juror No. 3, who 
had had a recent suicide in her family, who was quite 
•motional as she responded to some of my questions. 
And Mrs. Bingham made some comments about some 
personal prejudices in connection with this case. And 
perhaps that could be interpreted by some that way, not 
entirely clear, but she mentioned various things that 
concerned her about this case and in connection with the 
defendant in this case. 
Anyone here who feels that they were influenced by 
those comments of Mrs. Bingham in any way that would make it 
difficult for them to be fair and impartial, based upon her 
comments? Anyone? No response. 
Anything else, Counsel? 
Mr. Tanner? Yes. 
MR. TANNER: I misunderstood what your question 
is. I did put in two six-months period in the jury about 34 
years ago. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. And was that a 
criminal case or a civil case? 
MR. TANNER: Civil. 
THE COURT: Civil case? Do you recall if you 
8 6 
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ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION N _[^ ^_ 
All presumptions if J JW independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence an 1 a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
IH pruned quilt y beyond a J eab unable doubt And, in case jf J 
reasonable doubt as tu whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I h a v e hoi el of 0 1 ^ f oJ d \ i >u I 11 il I h e bin I i i - j| n I lie t at t 
i o prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof tc an absolute 
certainty. Now by reasonable d »ubf is meant i i ibl that 
based jn reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree t f 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
3L11 reasonable doubt. '* reasonable doubt is J loubt which 
reasonable men unl women would entertain an i if miiHt inse trom 
the evidence or the lack ot the evidence in this case 
o ft n r 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION (1 
M defendant is presumed IIJIJ u enl JI Jess flit defendant " .L 
proved guilty beyond d reasonable doubt. Where there JS d 
reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled fn an acquittal it is 
the State's responsil 11 ity f pi ve the delenJariL JI ill y beyond «i 
reasonable doubt. The State's evidence must eliminate a Ii 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does 
not require proof to an absolute certainty, 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and 
women would entertain, and it must be based on the evidence or the 
lack >f evidence in the rase In some circumstances, the mere 
possibility that the defendant did net commit the crime with which 
IK S!R is tharqftl may « teatt <i reasonable duiii t , huwf vet , ariy su h 
possibility must be based upon reason and logic, and not upon a 
purely emotional urge or a wholly speculative possibility. 
Jrocf IP> I 1 J i edoi rial IM inul r i ! hat Inijree f ) r f 
which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who 
are bound to art conscientiously upon it and eliminates ail 
reasonable IJUIJ / If t ei m i n<jt J u tliat d I I ndant lia romnitteii 
i crime beyond H reasonable doubt demands the application of 
reason, impartiality and common sense i must ha/e greater 
assurance if tlif r en t ML t nefaH »1 eu h a (k i iiiu than you would 
normally have in reaching the weighty decisions affecting your r wn 
life The reason for this standard is that you cannot undo your 
verdjit, once yoi have auiu mi nil ii In , HJI persona lite, n I h' 
other hand, you may be able to undo or modify the consequences ox 
decisions you make. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard 
of proof in the American system of justice; it is the standard that 
is always used in criminal cases, such as the case you will be 
deciding here. It is a much higher standard of proof than the 
standards of preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing 
evidence used in civil cases. If a scale were used to demonstrate 
the various standards of proof, with complete uncertainty at one 
end of the scale and absolute certainty at the other end, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt would be very close to the absolute 
certainty end of the scale. 
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